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America’s Union-Free Movement 





Within North America there is a school of thought that holds that 
unions have no place in well-managed enterprises. From that point of 
view, remaining “union free” and “union avoidance” are legitimate ob-
jectives of corporate policy. Maintaining a union-free environment not 
only relieves corporate management from the necessity of dealing with 
a potentially disruptive influence, it is also a public symbol suggesting 
that good human resource practices and business practices are in place. 
Thus, from this perspective, unionization of a nonunion enterprise or 
facility suggests poor management.1 
The International Labour Organization (ILO), on the other hand, 
promotes a philosophy that is completely at odds with union-free prin-
ciples. The vision of the ILO is that of an industrial relations system 
whose basic elements are those of social partnership—with worker rep-
resentatives and employer representatives as the partners—and social 
dialogue in which the partners discuss and negotiate a broad range of 
issues of mutual interest. Unions are seen to be the major institutions 
through which workers are able to participate in employment decision-
making. So that social dialogue may take place, unions and collective 
bargaining are to be encouraged rather than discouraged as indicated by 
union-free philosophy.
The ILO is a tripartite agency affiliated with the United Nations. 
Representatives from governments, trade unions, and the business com-
munity from most of the world’s countries meet once a year in Ge-
neva to legislate international standards for workers around the globe. 
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Employer and union representatives are appointed by their national 
governments. At a minimum one might expect those representatives to 
respect and help to foster acceptance of the ILO’s mission. If so, with 
regard to the employer representatives from the United States, that ex-
pectation would not be met. Instead, the U.S. Council on International 
Business, the organization delegated the responsibility for dealing with 
the ILO, pursues policies that have the effect of thwarting acceptance 
of ILO philosophy in the United States while accepting and sheltering 
adherents of the union-free philosophy. 
THE UNION-FREE MOVEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA
The fundamental tenets of the union-free philosophy may be sum-
marized as follows:
•  Unions are unnecessary if workers are fairly treated and well 
managed.
•  Unions are disruptive and frequently result in poor enterprise 
performance.
•  Because of one and two above, managers have a responsibility to 
the enterprise to institute policies that will maintain a union-free 
environment.
•  Unions are “outside organizations” standing disruptively be-
tween enterprise management and its employees.
As Kaufman (1993) has demonstrated, union-free philosophy has 
long had a strong following within the ranks of U.S. management. In 
the first decades of the twentieth century the labor problem was a major 
sociopolitical issue as workers protested their conditions of work and 
demanded that they be treated with respect and dignity rather than as 
soulless commodities. One answer to this social issue was good “per-
sonnel management” unilaterally instituted by employers with as much 
or as little employee input as the benevolent employer deemed to grant. 
As Kaufman (1993, p. 41) notes: 
PM [personnel management] advocates held labor unions in low 
regard. While they were prepared to admit that workers are all too 
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often driven to seek a union by autocratic, exploitative employ-
ers, they thought unions are not only incapable of solving the un-
derlying problem (poor management) but often saddle the firm, 
and workers with restrictive work rules, inflated wage demands, 
strikes, and international political intrigues.
Moreover, 
(t)hey also believed that labor unions are run by outsiders whose 
self-interest is served by fomenting conflict.
Among the organizations most firmly supporting this position was 
and continues to be the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). 
Throughout the twentieth century it consistently backed initiatives de-
signed to check the growth of unions and collective bargaining. In the 
1970s it organized the Council For a Union-Free Environment, whose 
mission is explicitly to foster union-free philosophy and behavior (Der-
ber 1984, p. 105). The council and the NAM continue to be closely 
interconnected, and the NAM actively circulates material produced by 
the council designed to aid employers intent on remaining union free.2 
The philosophy has been embraced not only by organizations whose 
major purpose is to thwart the advance of unionism, but also by human 
resources academics who have accepted “union substitution” as a legiti-
mate corporate goal. Consider the following comments that appear in a 
popular Canadian human resources text. In order to effectively imple-
ment a union-substitution strategy, “Human resource managers need 
to apply the ideas discussed in earlier chapters of this book. Failure 
to implement sound human resource policies and practices provides 
the motivation for workers to form unions” (Schwind, Das, and Wagar 
1999, pp. 661–662).
THE ILO AND ITS PHILOSOPHY OF  
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
The ILO was formed at the end of World War I. Its mission was to 
promote “social justice” as an essential condition for a lasting peace 
(Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 1996). Its annual 
labor conference, attended by delegates not only from states but also, 
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as noted above, by representatives of labor and management, was con-
ceived of as a kind of World Parliament of Labor (Kaufman 2004, 
p. 205). Its function was to establish, by the passage of conventions and 
recommendations, basic standards applicable globally. A professional 
bureau was created with a permanent professional staff whose job was 
to promote the standards and culture of the organization. One of its 
major missions was to pressure, cajole, or otherwise convince member 
states to make ILO conventions and recommendations part of their do-
mestic labor legislation and to foster practices that are consistent with 
ILO principles. 
Except for a period in the 1970s, when it withdrew as a protest 
against what it perceived to be undue influence of the Soviet Union, 
the United States has been a major supporter of the ILO and its mission 
(Kaufman 2004, p. 552; McIntyre and Bodah 2006). Indeed, although 
its enforcement capacity is limited by both custom and constitution, 
one reason for the considerable amount of success that the ILO has had 
over the years (see, e.g., Valticos 1998) is that the United States pres-
sures nations depending on it for trade and development aid to institute 
labor practices consistent with ILO standards (see Compa and Diamond 
1996). The flaw in this arrangement is that there is no world power 
strong enough to ensure that the United States itself abides by the stan-
dards it fosters elsewhere. 
Over the years the ILO has adopted nearly 200 conventions. Al-
though they establish the standard for all nations, most of them do not 
become binding unless ratified by the legislature of each state individu-
ally. A small subset, however, addresses “fundamental human rights.” 
These deal with freedom of association, collective bargaining, discrimi-
nation, forced labor, and child labor. The failure of any state to institute 
practices consistent with the principles inherent in these instruments is 
considered to be improper and offensive to the international order. 
Recently, in its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, the ILO affirmed its support for the human rights nature of 
the core set of labor standards (ILO 2000). Labor, business, and state 
representatives from the United States all supported and voted in favor 
of this declaration. 
With respect to unions and collective bargaining, the ILO’s philoso-
phy is embedded in two major conventions—numbers 87 (Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention) and 98 
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(Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention). It is further 
elaborated in the jurisprudence of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association, which hears complaints and issues public opinions which 
have accumulated into a body of international case law (Bartolomei de 
la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston, 1996, pp. 102–107). Whether 
they have ratified conventions or not, all member states of ILO are re-
quired, as a constitutional condition of membership, to institute poli-
cies consistent with the ILO’s interpretation of the meaning of the term 
Freedom of Association. Through its opinion on specific cases, it is the 
job of the Committee on Freedom of Association to give the concept 
concrete substance.
A review of relevant documents reveal the ILO philosophy on 
unions and collective bargaining to have the following basic tenets:
•  As stated in Article 2 of Convention 87, “All workers without 
distinction whatsoever, shall have a right to establish and . . . to 
join organizations of their own choosing.”
•  All workers have the right to select representatives of their own 
choosing (Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston, 
1996, p. 192).
•  Legitimately selected worker representatives have the right to 
be recognized by employers and other relevant authorities. As 
stated in Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 
(1996), “The general principle is that employers, including gov-
ernmental authorities in their capacity as employers, should rec-
ognize for collective bargaining the organizations that represent 
the workers employed by them” (pp. 219–220).
•  Employers have a responsibility both to recognize and negotiate 
with legitimately selected worker representatives. As Bartolomei 
de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston (1996) put it, “Without 
recognition of the right to negotiate the rest of the guarantees in 
the Convention (no. 87) are meaningless” (p. 228).
•  Member states have a responsibility, not merely to permit but 
rather to “promote” collective bargaining. As stated in the Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
“all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of member-
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ship in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize in 
good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles 
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining.” (ILO 2000, An-
nex 1)
• Budd’s (2004, p. 13) statement that “participation in decision 
making is an end in itself for rational human beings in a demo-
cratic society” is an almost perfect expression of fundamental 
ILO philosophy.
The ILO’s position on worker representation is well expressed in 
the report of the Director General to the 87th Session of the Internation-
al Labour Conference in 1999 entitled Decent Work (Somavia 1999). 
Somavia says, “The ILO is a forum for building consensus. Its tripartite 
structure reflects a conviction that the best solutions arise through social 
dialogue in its many forms and levels, from national tripartite consul-
tations and cooperation to plant-level collective bargaining.” He goes 
on to announce an initiative to “strengthen employers’ organizations, 
workers’ organizations and the government authorities that deal with 
labor.” A key objective of the programme is to “stress the importance 
of building strong bipartite and tripartite institutions.” In short, decent 
work for all is the central objective of the ILO and a collective voice for 
all workers is a keystone element of decent work. 
Union-free philosophy and that of the ILO are clearly irreconcil-
able. The ILO’s mission is to promote acceptance of unionism and the 
use of collective bargaining. The object of the union-free movement is 
to highlight the negative side of unionism and to encourage employers 
to take steps that will dissuade employees from unionizing and bargain-
ing collectively.
U.S. EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES AND THE ILO
In 1980, when the United States rejoined the ILO, it invited the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce to appoint a representative for employers. The 
Chamber refrained but instead turned the task over to the U.S. Council 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, which later became the 
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U.S. Council on International Business (USCIB) (Derber 1984, p. 105). 
That organization continues to represent the interests of the U.S. busi-
ness community at the ILO. In general, the USCIB, like the U.S. gov-
ernment, has supported efforts by the ILO to promote its mission in 
countries outside of the United States. With respect to the United States, 
however, it has instituted policies that have the effect of hindering the 
mission of the ILO and protecting adherents of union-free philosophy.
One of the major affiliates of the USCIB is the NAM, an organiza-
tion that, as noted earlier, has been promoting union avoidance since 
early in the twentieth century.3 Although the USCIB has not taken such 
an active role in the United States in promoting union-free philosophy, 
its activities at the national and international level have been consistent 
with those of the NAM.
A keystone element of USCIB strategy is the assertion that ILO 
standards apply only to states and not to corporations.4 Within the ILO 
(where consensus is a prime operating principle), they and their inter-
national employer colleagues have insisted on that interpretation. As a 
result, to achieve its mission, the ILO secretariat is, for the most part, 
limited procedurally to work through the aegis of domestic legislation 
rather than through direct pressure on labor organizations and employ-
ers. Nevertheless, according to recent legal research on international 
human rights law, that employer position is untenable with respect to 
a subset of ILO standards that have been heralded to be fundamental 
human rights. 
Until recently the ILO had not “found it necessary to adopt an official 
position designating some conventions as those covering ‘fundamental 
human rights’” (Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 
1996, p. 129). But in the context of globalization and concerns about 
the negative effects of expanding global trade on labor conditions, it has 
recently taken steps to clarify that certain core rights are human rights 
and, as such, are subject to the same respect and obligations as pertain 
to other universally accepted human rights. These core labor human 
rights are, according to the ILO’s recent Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, the right to be free from discrimination, 
slavery, and child labor; the right to freedom of association; and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively one’s conditions of work. Un-
derlying these rights are eight ILO conventions and a body of case law, 
which define the behavior required for compliance with the standards 
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(ILO 2000). Although ordinary standards and conventions respecting 
them apply only to states, human rights standards apply universally. 
According to Paust (2002), international human rights standards 
apply not only to states but also to individuals including corporations, 
which, at law, are simply juridic persons. In the words of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (quoted by Paust), international human rights 
are obligatio erga omnes. They apply not only to states but instead are 
“owing by and to all humankind.” 
This interpretation was recently supported by a United Nations Sub-
commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which 
produced a report entitled Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights. With regard to corporations, the subcommission, com-
posed of human rights experts from around the globe, stated that 
even though States have the primary responsibility to promote, se-
cure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as 
organs of society, are also responsible for promoting and securing 
the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.5 
Freedom of association is prominently mentioned in the Univer-
sal Declaration, and the ILO and its organs (such as the Committee on 
Freedom of Association) are considered by the international commu-
nity to be the appropriate vehicles for interpreting that right (see, for 
example, OECD 1996). 
Not surprisingly some employer representatives found fault with 
the report. As an article at the USCIB’s Web site noted: 
The International Chamber of Commerce and the International Or-
ganisation of Employers have opposed adoption of the Norms [by 
the full Human Rights Commission], contrasting the dichotomy of 
this compulsory approach to company behavior with the voluntary 
‘good-practices’ approach of other UN initiatives, most impor-
tantly Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Global Compact. (USCIB 
2003)
After hearing from various stakeholders, in February 2005 the UN’s 
High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on “The respon-
sibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises 
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with regard to human rights.”6 In the report, the high commissioner 
suggests that business has three types of responsibilities with respect 
to human rights: to respect and support human rights and to make sure 
they are not complicit in human rights abuses. Respect requires “busi-
ness to refrain from acts that could interfere with the enjoyment of hu-
man rights.” With regard to complicity, she notes “one definition of 
‘complicity’ states that a company is complicit in human rights abuses 
if it authorizes, tolerates, or knowingly ignores human rights abuses 
committed by an entity associated with it, or if the company knowingly 
provides practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of human rights abuse.” 
After noting that the responsibilities of corporations are not as ex-
tensive as those of states, the high commissioner goes on to consider the 
human rights that are most relevant to business. Among them she iden-
tifies freedom of association and the right to organize. Rather than draw 
firm binding conclusions, the high commissioner called for continu-
ing dialogue with a view toward better clarifying the responsibilities 
of business. Nevertheless, it seems clear from the high commissioner’s 
comments that business does have human rights responsibilities and in 
some areas those responsibilities are obvious. Labor relations would 
appear to qualify as one of those areas. Active attempts by companies to 
dissuade their employees from evoking their right to organize and bar-
gain collectively surely “interfere with the enjoyment of human rights” 
and thus constitute human rights violations.7
Since the right to organize and to bargain collectively is a funda-
mental human right, behavior with respect to it is subject to the standard 
laid out by Paust (2002). U.S. employers who put in place policies in-
tended to maintain union-free status do not offend contemporary U.S. 
labor relations norms. They do, however, offend international human 
rights law. And, by insisting that the ILO promote its agenda through 
governments rather than directly, the USCIB shelters U.S. employers 
from criticism for implementing union-free strategy and thereby reneg-
ing on their human rights obligations. 
Below is a quote from a document of the International Organisation 
of Employers (the organization, of which the USCIB is a constituent, 
whose primary role is representing employer interests at the ILO and 
in other international forums) interpreting the Global Compact which 
incorporates the declaration:
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The Global Compact is not a code of conduct nor is it a prescriptive 
instrument . . . Instead, the Compact creates a forum for learning 
and sharing experiences in the promotion of the nine principles. 
Through the Global Compact, companies demonstrate to their em-
ployees and communities how they are being responsible corpo-
rate citizens. How, or even whether, a company seeks to display 
this commitment is a matter of choice. (International Organisation 
of Employers 2001, italics added)
In other words, it is the employer representative position that it is 
perfectly acceptable for corporate members of IOE-affiliated employer 
associations, such as the USCIB, to ignore or offend the principles in-
cluded in the compact, even when they publicly endorse it and even 
though some of those principles deal with fundamental human rights 
and thus are subject to international human rights law. This stance has 
led one international trade union official to wonder whether employer 
strategy with respect to this issue has more to do with image manipu-
lation than with making an honest behavorial commitment to comply 
with international standards (Baker 2004). 
Although it supports ILO work with respect to the behavior of other 
countries, many aspects of U.S. law do not comply with ILO princi-
ples. The United States has ratified neither of the two basic conventions 
(numbers 87 and 98) having to do with freedom of association, unions, 
and collective bargaining. This failure is due in part to opposition by the 
USCIB despite endorsement of those principles by its Geneva represen-
tatives who voted in favor of the Declaration of Fundamental Principles. 
Its rationale for doing so is its position that, although many U.S. laws 
fail to conform to the letter of international labor law, the body of U.S. 
law, nevertheless, provides protection equivalent to or better than inter-
national norms. U.S. workers are, it is claimed, better off than those in 
most other countries and so the details of how that is accomplished are 
unimportant (Morehead 2003; Potter 1984). 
A recent study by Human Rights Watch (2000), which reported 
research indicating that denial of basic labor rights is rampant in the 
United States, found great difficulty with the position that U.S. law 
and practice conforms to international standards. McIntyre and Bodah 
(2006) are also critical of that position. The notion that the United States 
has the right to institute laws it considers to be adequate, even if they 
are inconsistent with ILO requirements, makes a mockery of the prin-
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ciple that all of the world’s workers should enjoy certain common stan-
dards. It is also offensive to the basic democratic notion that all (nations 
in this case) are equal under the law. Nevertheless, that position is used 
by U.S. governments, supported by U.S. employer representatives, to 
justify their failure to ratify core ILO human rights conventions, while 
at the same time insisting that other countries conform to them.
One way in which U.S. law may be technically in line with ILO 
jurisprudence has to do, oddly enough, with union recognition. Recent 
research by Morris (2005, 2006) suggests that policies intended to pre-
serve union-free status offend existing U.S. law. Building on previous 
legal analysis by Summers (1992), Morris demonstrates that U.S. em-
ployers have a legal duty under the National Labor Relations Act and 
the U.S. constitution to recognize and negotiate with representatives 
chosen by their employees whether or not those representatives have 
been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. If no union has 
exclusive representation, then the employer responsibility is, voluntari-
ly, to recognize and deal with the legitimately chosen bargaining agent 
of any group of employees. 
The ILO standard with respect to union recognition is identical to 
the Morris/Summers interpretation of U.S. law. According to the au-
thors of a recent review of ILO collective bargaining principles: “If no 
union covers more than 50 percent of the workers, collective bargaining 
rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of 
their own members” (Gernigon, Odero, and Guido 2000, p. 38). 
The Morris/Summers interpretation of U.S. labor law arrived as a 
surprise to many academics and practitioners. In practice, U.S. employ-
ers commonly refuse to deal with any union other than exclusive rep-
resentatives who have been certified by the state and the norm is for 
employers vigorously to oppose certification. That practice has gone on 
for some time, without challenge, so it is still a matter of legal opinion 
whether or not the courts would uphold the Morris/Summers position. 
It is clear, however, that refusal to recognize and deal with minority 
unions is a violation of ILO human rights standards, and thus of interna-
tional human rights law binding on all. In short, failure to recognize and 
deal with a minority union is a human rights offense of the same order 
as engaging in overt discrimination or employing child labor. 
Another element of USCIB strategy, as already mentioned, is to op-
pose ratification of ILO standards by the United States. One of the main 
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justifications for doing so is the assertion that many U.S. laws would 
have to be altered as a result. There is differing legal opinion about the 
validity of that assertion (McIntyre and Bodah 2006). Nevertheless, it is 
certainly beyond doubt that many laws regulating labor relations in the 
United States are offensive to the letter and spirit of ILO standards.
Edward E. Potter has long been one of the USCIB’s main spokes-
persons at the ILO. In the mid-1980s he wrote a monograph entitled 
Freedom of Association, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargain-
ing (1984). His avowed purpose in doing so was to elaborate the Ameri-
can employer view that ratification of basic ILO conventions would 
have a disruptive effect on the United States by requiring changes 
to many U.S. laws. The document was, in fact, a compendium of in-
stances in which U.S. law fails to comply with international standards. 
For example, while ILO standards require governments to “encourage 
and promote the full development and utilization of the machinery for 
voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ associations 
and workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements,” in the 
United States “a number of states . . . do not provide collective bargain-
ing rights for all or some categories of employees and, in Virginia, col-
lective bargaining has been determined by the courts to violate the state 
constitution” (Potter 1984, pp. 58–59). To one formally committed to 
seeing the standards of the ILO implemented globally, bringing U.S. 
law up to international standard might seem to be the obvious solution 
to this situation. Instead, the USCIB defends the continuation of prac-
tices clearly offensive to ILO philosophy.
Not only does the USCIB shelter the union-free movement by op-
posing ratification by the United States of ILO human rights conven-
tions and insisting that ILO standards apply to governments but not cor-
porations, it also has recruited outspoken union-free advocates to serve 
as ILO representative. Morehead (2003) made the following statement 
at a meeting on human rights in employment, to which he was invited 
because of his role as an employer representative at the ILO:
I was bemused at the naiveté in one part of the Human Rights 
Watch Report (2000) where as evidence of management hostility 
to unions they cited a study by Professors Freeman and Rogers 
that a majority of managers would oppose any unionization ef-
fort in their workplace, and at least one-third of them said it could 
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hurt their advancement in the company if employees they manage 
formed a union. Of course it is going to hurt their advancement. If I 
have learned one thing in over 30 years of dealing with unions, it is 
managements—not unions—which organize a workplace. I should 
add bad management at that, so of course it will reflect badly on 
them. In hundreds of conversations with local union leaders over 
the years, it was never wages or benefits that got them interested in 
a union: it was their treatment by management. 
The statement is an excellent example of union-free philosophy at 
work.
CONCLUSION
Union-free philosophy is irreconcilable with international human 
rights standards and the philosophy of employment relations advocated 
by the ILO. The two cannot coincide with integrity. The union-free phi-
losophy is offensive to the human right of workers to organize and bar-
gain collectively. Union-free philosophy must be rejected by everyone 
who supports the international human rights consensus and the work of 
the ILO. It follows then that the appropriate course for the agency cho-
sen to designate representatives and develop employer strategy within 
the ILO is to reject it. America’s employer representatives at the ILO 
should be expected to embrace the standards and philosophy of that 
organization and work toward its vision of ethical industrial relations. 
If the USCIB is unwilling to commit to that project, the U.S. govern-
ment should appoint another, more progressive organization to fulfill 
that task.
Notes
 1. This view is well articulated in the management manual of a large, nonunion 
U.S. firm and in the seminar materials of a law firm advertising itself as spe-
cializing in “union avoidance.” Both of these documents are available from the 
author on request. 
 2. See http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=22&DID=201891 and http://
www.cueinc.com/about_us/overview.asp?id=0&tkn=0.
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 3. The president of the NAM serves as a USCIB trustee (see the USCIB Web site, 
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=742, accessed December 10, 
2004).
 4. Interviews and written exchanges with ILO officials, including Lee Swepston 
and Ed Potter. Potter has long been a key member of the USCIB’s team of repre-
sentatives to the ILO. Most of these exchanges took place during 2002. 
 5. See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.
 6. Available online at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home.
 7. In July 2005 the UN appointed John Ruggie of the United States, an expert on 
human rights and one-time UN official, Special Representative on Business 
Enterprise and Human Rights. Ruggie’s prime mandate is to clarify the human 
rights responsibilities of corporations. He is expected to issue an interim report 
in 2006 and a final report in 2007.
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